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FROM FOUNDING FATHERS TO RELUCTANT EUROPEANS; WHAT HAPPENED TO
FRANCE’S EUROPEAN DREAM?
Lecture delivered by Lara Marlowe, France correspondent for The Irish Times, to the
Association of Franco-Irish Studies annual conference, National Concert Hall Dublin, 23 May
2014

The European project is threatened by public apathy and indifference. It is suffocated by the
complexity of EU institutions, thwarted by national egotism, and threatened by the rise of
populist, europhobic parties. Exit polls last night showed that Geert Wilders’ anti-Europe
Freedom Party performed poorly, but we won’t know until Sunday night whether europhobe
parties will, as predicted, led the polls in France and Britain.
Over the decades I’ve lived in Paris, I’ve watched friends, neighbours and colleagues fall out of
love with Europe. In preparing this lecture, I’ve tried to understand why. For weeks, I’ve been
asking French people how they feel about Europe.
THE DISILLUSIONED
At the National Front’s May Day rally, an elderly lady with white hair, a retired accountant, told
me how immigrants “invaded” her neighbourhood in Montmartre. “There’s no more work;
there’s nothing,” she said. “I want une Europe choisie – a chosen Europe. At the very least, I
want people who join Europe to be at our level. Our shops are closing because everything is
made by the Chinese. I miss the franc terribly. I want us to be sovereign in our own country, not
taking orders from Brussels.”
A few nights ago, I had dinner with a French businesswoman who votes for centrist, proEuropean parties. She’s the sort of person you’d expect to embrace the free trade and
competition ethos of the EU. But no, she told me: “I have the impression Europe is all about the
power of lobby groups in Brussels, that its obsession with uniformity is destroying the souls of
our countries.”
Member states don’t want Europe to take on big issues, but the EU is ridiculed when it deals
with small matters. Martin Schulz, the president of the EU Parliament and socialist candidate for
the presidency of the next Commission, says Europe “must stop legislating over bottles of olive
oil and the size of toilet tanks.” He’s right.
Statistics published by the EU Commission’s Eurobarometer show how dramatically French
enthusiasm for Europe has fallen. In 1990, 70 per cent of French people said belonging to the
EU was “a good thing.” Support began to ebb with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when people
realised they would have to sacrifice a degree of sovereignty to build Europe.
It plummeted further in 2005, when 55 per cent of French voters rejected the Constitutional
Treaty. President Nicolas Sarkozy subsequently ignored the will of the majority by pushing the
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Lisbon Treaty -- which is virtually identical to the failed Constitution – through parliament for
ratification.
Ironically, the Constitutional Treaty was drafted by France’s most pro-European former
president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Giscard has privately told friends he will not vote in the
French EU election on Sunday, because a Europe of 28 member states, where tiny countries have
the same say as great powers like France, is unmanageable and meaningless.
In this month’s Eurobarometer, only 31 per cent of French respondents say they have a positive
image of Europe. From 70 per cent support in 1990, to 31 percent today. Poll results vary, but
the downward trend is undeniable.
Similar declines have been registered across the Union. In this month’s Eurobarometer, Europe
as a whole was only slightly more upbeat than France, with 34 per cent saying they have a
positive image of the Union – and substantially less positive than Ireland, where 41 per cent of
respondents still view Europe favourably.
Economic crisis is the most obvious explanation for dissatisfaction. It’s particularly acute in
France, where 87 per cent of the population say the economy is bad (compared to an EU average
of 65 per cent). The Eurobarometer shows French distrust of their own government is
particularly high, at 80 per cent. If the French liked their own government, they would probably
like the EU more too.
As the Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman says, “As long as political leaders have
nothing but sacrifice and unemployment to offer their citizens, speeches are pointless.”
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 2005 CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY REFERENDUM
I mentioned the 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendum. It’s worth coming back to, because it
was the original, trust-destroying sin perpetrated by the French government. I believe that if EU
leaders had concentrated more on achieving clear, united policies and concrete projects, instead
of obsessing over institutions, treaties and process, people would be less disaffected.
The feeling of betrayal among those 55 per cent of French voters who rejected the Constitution
remains intense. They say their universal suffrage was trampled on and swept under the carpet.
The pro-Europe MEP Sylvie Goulard compares the No vote to a dead body. It was, she told me,
“shoved in the fridge. And they held a foot on the door. It was very unhealthy; like a family
secret. They tried to repress it psychologically. But when you repress things they always come
back to the surface.”
Some countries, like Ireland, have welcomed the opportunities created by globalisation – that is
to say the unprecedented mobility of money, people, products and ideas over the last two
decades.
For the most part, the French fear globalisation, which they have come to equate with
Europeanisation. They see themselves as losers in both processes. Opponents of the
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Constitutional Treaty called it the “Trojan horse” or “shoe horn” of globalisation. France’s
maverick, left-wing economy minister Arnaud Montebourg even claims it is possible to “deglobalise”.
In a more rational vein, Pascal Lamy, the former head of the World Trade Organisation, gives
this analogy: “In globalisation, instead of repairing their boat, the French say, “Let us drain the
ocean.”
Opponents of the Constitutional Treaty said a Yes vote was a vote for liberal Europe. France has
a unique aversion to economic liberalism, which has replaced capitalism in French parlance.
Similarly, a No vote was deemed a vote for “social Europe,” by the left. They wanted, and still
want, a Europe in the French image, with a legally enforced minimum wage and extensive social
protection for everyone.
59 per cent of French socialists voted No in 2005. Despite that, Europe has grown more liberal
and less social. Now they’re being asked to play the fool’s game again, to vote for socialist
candidates on Sunday, again on the pretext that they will be voting for a “social Europe”.
FATHERS OF EUROPE
The French have been divided over Europe since 1763, when Britain defeated France in the
Seven Years War, forcing it to accept British colonial predominance outside Europe. A long line
of nationalists, including Napoleon and Charles de Gaulle, dreamed of heroism, revenge and
sticking it to “les anglo-saxons”. Others, starting with Napoleon’s foreign minister Talleyrand,
advocated multi-lateralism, cooperation and a European concert of nations.
It was Victor Hugo who first used the phrase “the United States of Europe,” in a speech in 1849.
On Europe Day in 2005, just before the failed referendum, I heard Gérard Depardieu read
Hugo’s text in the salon de l’Horloge, the very room in the French foreign ministry where
Europe was born on May 9, 1950 – about which more in a few minutes.
I cannot imagine Depardieu reading that text, in that place, today. Depardieu has since become a
tax exile, was convicted of drink driving, and has just starred in a semi-pornographic film about
Dominique Strauss-Kahn.
The present French foreign minister Laurent Fabius was a leader of the No camp that defeated
the Constitutional Treaty which Depardieu promoted in 2005. And much of the French political
class have become self-hating Europeans, too cautious to allude to a concept as unfashionable as
“the United States of Europe”.
I’ll nonetheless read what Victor Hugo said in 1849: “The day will come when we will see two
immense groups, the United States of America and the United States of Europe facing one
another, holding out their hands across the seas, exchanging their trade, industry, arts, genius…”
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I mentioned the birth of Europe in the salon de l’Horloge. The European Coal and Steel
Community, the embryo of today’s EU, was the brainchild of Jean Monnet. The son of a Cognac
dealer, Monnet was a high-ranking official at the League of Nations in the early 1920s. He made
a fortune selling alcohol in the US during prohibition, and in high finance. During the Second
World War, he persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to launch a massive arms production
programme.
In August 1943, Monnet told de Gaulle’s government in exile: "There will be no peace in
Europe, if the states are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty... The countries of
Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the necessary prosperity and social development.
The European states must constitute themselves into a federation..."
Monnet wrote the declaration creating the European Coal and Steel Community, which was read
by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. Schuman’s own story mirrored Europe’s fraught
history. His father had fled Lorraine when Germany annexed Alsace and Lorraine in 1870.
Schuman was born in Luxembourg, and became a French citizen only when France regained
Alsace-Lorraine at the close of the First World War.
The Coal and Steel Community brought together the six founding members of the European
Community: France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. Germany’s
coal and steel production – which were crucial to rebuilding Europe, just five years after the war
– were placed under a supranational authority headed by Jean Monnet. Schuman stated clearly
that “…this proposal represents the first concrete step towards a European federation, imperative
for the preservation of peace."
Monnet and Schuman thus established France’s reputation as the cradle of Europe. But as
Thierry Chopin, the director of studies at the Robert Schuman Foundation in Paris, pointed out to
me, “From the beginning, the French had an ambivalent attitude towards Europe. France has
been both an engine of European integration and a brake on it.”
The first big setback in European integration occurred in 1954, when the French National
Assembly voted against the European Defence Community. It was the middle of the Cold War,
and the US wanted Europe to join the fight against communism. But the agreement created a
political storm in France because it meant a degree of lost sovereignty, and because it allowed
German rearmament.
Nor was Charles de Gaulle, the towering French leader of the 20th century, a convinced
European. De Gaulle paralysed the EEC in 1965 by creating the “empty chair crisis” over
agricultural policy. He vetoed British membership twice.
In 1965, de Gaulle made what is probably the most famous speech by a French leader about
Europe. We are going to show it to you in a moment. For those of you whose French is a little
rusty, I’ll summarise it first. De Gaulle says: Now that we’re all friends in western Europe, it’s
perfectly normal for us to show solidarity to one another. For de Gaulle, Europe meant only
“organised solidarity”.
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Mocking the federalists who want to create a “United States of Europe”, de Gaulle says, quite
comically – and watch for this at the end of the short film clip – “You can jump on your chair
like a kid goat saying ‘Europe! Europe! Europe!’ but that leads to nothing and it means
nothing.”
“Dès lors que nous ne nous battons plus entre Européens occidentaux, dès lors qu’il n’y a
plus de rivalités immédiates et qu’il n’y a pas de guerre, ni même de guerre imaginable, entre la
France et l’Allemagne, entre la France et l’Ialie, et bien entendu, entre la France, l’Allemagne,
l’Italie et l’Angeleterre, eh bien! Il est absolument normal que s’établisse entre ces pays
occidentaux une solidarité. C’est cela l’Europe, et je crois que cette solidarité doit être
organisée. Il s’agit de savoir comment et sous quelle forme.
Alors, il faut prendre les choses comme elles sont, car on ne fait pas de politique autrement que
sur les réalités. Bien entendu, on peut sauter sur sa chaise comme un cabri en disant ‘l’Europe!
l’Europe! l’Europe!’ Mais cela n’aboutit à rien et cela ne signifie rien.”
THE FEDERALIST ARGUMENT
Today, there are only a handful of self-avowed European federalists left in French politics. Two
of the most popular, the green leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Jean-Louis Borloo, leader of the
centrist UDI, have just retired from politics. Few pro-Europeans today have the courage to say,
as Cohen-Bendit does, that “Building a European identity means surpassing national identity.”
Pro-Europeans in France are under attack by sovereignist euroskeptics like the UMP deputy
Henri Guaino, Nicolas Sarkozy’s former speechwriter. Guaino refuses to vote for the leader of
his own party’s list in the Paris region, the pro-Europe MEP Alain Lamassoure, on the grounds
that Lamassoure “embodies the Europe that nobody wants.”
Federalists resent being asked why they persist in dreaming of a “United States of Europe”
despite polls and studies showing that some 70 per cent of Europeans do not want further
integration.
Sylvie Goulard, the federalist MEP whom I quoted earlier about the body in the fridge, blames
the heads of state and government who have monopolised power for preventing the emergence of
an EU that could win the loyalty of its citizens. When I asked her if politicians should ignore the
will of the majority to do what is best for Europe, Goulard said, “Yes. Definitely… What people
want or don’t want is irrelevant.” Without a more integrated Europe, she argues, member states
cannot compete with China, finance their own defence, tackle climate change, fight terrorism or
organised crime.
Dominique Reynié, the director of the Foundation for Political Innovation and a professor at
Sciences Po, said it’s impossible to know what the French really want, because European
federalism is not on offer. “Marine Le Pen’s National Front says loud and clear that they want to
leave Europe,” Reynié explains. “People understand that. The pro-Europeans say, ‘We need
Europe, but not this Europe – a different one.’”
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The French haven’t fallen out of love with Europe, Reynié argues. “They’ve turned against a
political class that is incapable of explaining why it has made Europe.”
Here’s a quote from a European leader, the German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble, that to
me epitomises the kind of gobbledygook that Reynié referred to. Dr Schauble wrote in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper this week that Europe should be “a multilayered democracy:
not a federal state… and yet more than a union of states with loose, weakly legitimised binding
elements. Europe would be a complementary, interlocked system of democracies of various
ranges and competences… a national European double-democracy.”
Did you understand that? I didn’t.
ENLARGEMENT/FRENCH PREFERENCE FOR SMALL EUROPE
Three weeks ago, Tánaiste and foreign affairs minister Eamon Gilmore marked the tenth
anniversary of the “big bang” enlargement of the EU which brought the Union from 15 to 25
members. He said enlargement was positive for Ireland and noted that Irish exports to central
and eastern Europe have tripled in the past decade. Ireland exported 4.3 billion euros in goods
and services to central and eastern Europe last year – as much as to China and Brazil combined.
In France, the anniversary was scarcely mentioned. Enlargement was never properly explained
to the French, and it has been very unpopular, especially the 2007 enlargement to Romania and
Bulgaria, with the subsequent influx of tens of thousands of Roma.
The Europe expert Thierry Chopin explains it this way: “The majority of French people prefer a
small Europe, because the more Europe enlarges, the less it resembles what France wants… Not
only are the east Europeans economic liberals, they’re also Atlanticists. The French long wanted
Europe to be a counterweight to US power… For economic, political and geopolitical reasons,
the French are nostalgic for little Europe – for the Europe of Charlemagne.”
In the early days of integration, it was possible to travel to all the capitals of Europe in one day
by train. Now, says Bruno Cautrès, who teaches the sociology of EU integration at Sciences Po,
“The enlargement of Europe has rendered almost meaningless the question of political and
economic integration. Europe is a huge economic space that hasn’t managed to become a true
political system.”
The former European affairs minister Laurent Wauquiez provides a prime example of nostalgia
for the Europe of Charlemagne in his new book, titled “Europe: Everything Must Change.”
Wauquiez advocates reverting to a core Europe of six EU countries: France, Germany, Belgium
Holland, Italy and Spain. Those are the original countries of the Coal and Steel Community,
plus Spain and minus Luxembourg, which Wauquiez dismisses as a haven for money-launderers.
When he was European affairs minister, Wauquiez says, “I went to these soulless buildings in
Brussels where 28 people sit around a table with 22 interpreters’ booths. Everyone talks three
minutes. No one listens and nothing moves forward. What is this hell?”
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The idea of creating a core Europe around the 18 members of the euro zone is popular in France,
advocated, among others, by the economist Thomas Piketty whose book on income inquality –
“Capital in the Twenty-First Century” is a best-seller in the US.
Piketty and other signators of the “Manifesto for a political union of the euro” want to pool the
debts of the 18 eurozone countries, create a smaller eurogroup parliament alongside the main EU
parliament, and chose a permanent president for the eurogroup.
There is also a running debate in France about the euro fort – the strong euro – which the
socialist government and the National Front blame for the collapse of French exports. Nonsense,
say the French right: Germany trades in the same currency, and its exports are thriving. The
problem is the lack of French competitiveness.
The far left and far right have used negotiations between the US and Europe on a free trade
agreement to scare-monger during the European election campaign. They predict that the big,
bad transatlantic market will force Europeans to consume American hormone beef, genetically
modified organisms and chicken soaked in bleach.
EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT/GERMANY
By pulling the centre of European gravity eastwards, the enlargements of 2004, 2007, and 2013
have increased German influence, says Bruno Cautrès of Sciences Po. East European workers
are fuelling German economic growth, by working for low wages in Germany, and in the
factories that Germany has built in their countries.
By contrast, many thousands of French jobs have been lost in agriculture, road transport, meat
processing and construction, due to the arrival of some 300,000 mostly east European workers
under the 1996 EU directive on “posted workers”. In theory, posted workers are temporary, and
must be paid the French minimum wage – a rule not often enforced. Moreover, employers pay
the much lower social charges applicable in the worker’s home country. This legal undercutting
of the French labour market by workers from elsewhere in the EU is one of the chief grievances
of the far right-wing National Front.
France had envisioned Europe as a means of containing Germany, only to find that Germany
now runs the EU. The impression of a triumphant Angela Merkel is strengthened by Francois
Hollande’s feeble leadership. It’s not uncommon to hear disgruntled French politicians label
those who admire German success as “collaborators,” an ugly allusion to the Second World War.
At the height of the Greek debt crisis, Arnaud Montebourg, who was not yet France’s economy
minister, accused Germany of “building its fortune on our (economic) ruin.” He added that
“German nationalism is re-emerging through Madame Merkel’s Bismarck-like policies.” The
allusion to Otto von Bismarck, who defeated France in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, made clear
Montebourg’s belief that economic domination is the modern version of German territorial
expansion.
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For their part, the Germans are exasperated by France’s failure to reform or comply with the
budgetary rules that Paris voted for. As Alain Juppé, a conservative senior statesman and
possible contender for the 2017 French presidential election said this month, “The Germans have
no confidence in us and see us as the sick man of Europe.”
IRELAND
When Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, at the same time as Britain and Denmark, Garret
FitzGerald, then minister for foreign affairs, was so eager to differentiate Ireland from Britain
that he spoke French in EU meetings, and asked Irish officials to do the same whenever possible.
France and Ireland have been fast allies on the Common Agricultural Policy, which was the main
incentive for Ireland to join Europe. That alliance has continued all the way to the most recent
budget negotiations.
Yet France and Ireland have starkly different attitudes towards the desirability of a European
defence system, trade, the US domination of the internet – which the French see as a threat to
Europe – and corporation tax.
Corporate tax is the only issue over which there has been real tension between France and
Ireland. I remember the Jospin government accusing Ireland of “fiscal dumping” back in 2000.
Paris has shifted its focus to forcing Google and other internet giants to pay corporate tax in
France. But if integration of eurozone economies continues apace, as it has through the
economic crisis, harmonisation of corporate tax – and an end to Ireland’s 12.5 per cent rate – can
be only a matter of time.
IMMIGRATION
Though immigration ceased to be an issue in Ireland about a decade ago, Europe’s failure to
stem illegal immigration is a volatile issue in France. On Wednesday, the former President
Nicolas Sarkozy advocated suspending the Schengen agreement on freedom of movement. More
than half the French television debate on the European elections last night was devoted to
immigration.
The case of 15 year-old Leonarda Dibrani, a Roma schoolgirl who was expelled with her family
to Kosovo last year, typifies the debate in France. Francois Hollande’s attempt to please
everyone by saying Leonarda could return to France, but without her family, felt flat.
Days before the European election, the National Front has seized on a press report saying the
Dibranis may obtain Croatian nationality and thus return to France (since Croatia joined the EU
last year) as proof that Schengen and the EU promote the settlement of undesirables in France.
Eight months after 350 Africans drowned off the coast of Lampedusa, immigration is a political
time bomb which the EU and governing political parties are at a loss to deal with. The means
devoted by the EU to controlling immigration are derisory: 300 Frontex agents and 89 mn euros
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annually. That’s 0.4 per cent of the $24 bn the US spends on its 63,000 border guards and
50,000 coast guards.
Europe’s 28 heads of state and government twice postponed any political decision on
immigration policy until after this week’s elections.
FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY
In foreign and defence policy too, Europe finds it hard to exist. The Ukrainian crisis has shown
the limits of the foreign policy which the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was supposed to create. One can
argue that the EU helped to create the crisis in the first place. The 28 EU members have no
problem denouncing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the referendums in eastern Ukraine. But
the moment there’s a question of punishing Russia, all semblance of unity dissolves.
The EU’s performance in the Central African Republic, where Muslims and Christians have been
massacring each other for more than a year, shows how little progress has been made towards an
EU defence policy. As Daniel Cohn-Bendit said this month, “There are 1.8 mn soldiers in
uniform in Europe, but we can’t find 70,000 to go to the Central African Republic?” It took four
months of French pleading for the EU to finally agree to send 800 soldiers to Bangui last month.
For as long as I have covered France for The Irish Times, a total of 14 years, French politicians
have portrayed Europe as a multiplier of French power; as President Francois Hollande put it
this month, “a way of weighing on the fate of the world.”
The previous socialist president, Francois Mitterrand, said he wanted “a strong France in a strong
Europe.” Instead, the French perceive a weak France in a weak Europe.
CULTURE
Eamon Maher originally asked me to talk about convergence between French and Irish culture,
which would have been more in keeping with the other papers presented here. I savoured the
thought of doing research on George Moore, Roderic O’Conor, Joyce and Beckett…
Then I realised that I was scheduled to speak to you in the midst of elections to the European
Parliament. I decided to kill two birds with one stone by delving into disaffection with Europe
for my newspaper and the AFIS conference at the same time.
Before closing, I would like to say a few words about culture though, because I believe it is
possibly the most powerful and unrecognised force holding Europe together.
The Austrian Jewish writer Stefan Zweig was a great chronicler of Europe from the turn of the
last century until his suicide during the Second World War. In 1932, Zweig published a small
book titled “Appeal to the Europeans,” in which he argued for European integration through
culture. Europeans should teach culture – not political and diplomatic history – to their children,
Zweig wrote. “The history of wars leads youths to admire violence. The history of culture
teaches them respect for the mind.”
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Zweig was a federalist precursor of Monnet, Schuman and Cohn-Bendit. “As long as the
European idea has not taken a fundamentally visible form, capable of inspiring enthusiasm; as
long as it has not become a kind of patriotism and supra-nationalism for individuals, it is
condemned to sterility and will not manage to transform itself into reality,” he wrote.
“Does European culture exist?” was the title of an excellent article by my colleague Enda
O’Doherty in the Dublin Review of Books, which he edits, and which you can read online.
O’Doherty debunked the assertion of the Hungarian philosopher Agnes Heller that there is no
such thing as European culture. He listed the Europe-wide movements that prove the contrary:
the centuries-long use of Latin by the educated across Europe; Gothic architecture; Renaissance
art; the Enlightenment; Romanticism. “The interconnectedness was so strong and so longlasting that the notion that there has never been anything other than national musics, national
literatures, national traditions of painting is little short of an absurdity,” O’Doherty concludes.
THE UPBEAT ARGUMENTS
Peace and prosperity attributed to the EU are the main arguments politicians use in the hope of
endearing it to the public. The generation who remember the Second World War is dying out,
but the achievement of the longest period of peace in European history nonetheless remains a
powerful argument. The latest Eurobarometer shows 55 per cent of the French rank peace
among EU members as the most positive accomplishment of the EU.
And Europe has arguably created prosperity, though it’s difficult to convince citizens of that at
the moment. Jean-Dominique Giuliani, the head of the Robert Schuman Foundation, has just
published a book titled “How and why Europe will remain the heart of the world.” Giuliani
notes that Europe represents 20 per cent of the world’s wealth, and 42 per cent of trade on the
planet. It receives 30 per cent of global investments. The euro is the world’s second reserve
currency, after the dollar.
And despite its reputation as a bastion of liberal economics, Europe is among the highest
achievers when judged by the UN’s human development indicators: in terms of life expectancy,
access to education and -- except for Romania and Bulgaria -- per capita GDP. Europe’s medical
care and expenditure on social programmes are unrivalled. Europe is, Giuliani notes, the
continent with the least inequality.
Yet all these positives fail to add up to a vision for the future. There is no consensus on what
Europe should be, and its leaders often work at cross purposes. It is ironic that David Cameron
has promised a referendum on pulling out of Europe at a time when the British preference for a
vast free trade zone is the one that prevails, and English – not French – is the language of
Europe.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau defined democracy as what occurs “when sufficiently informed people
deliberate.” In the EU, people are not sufficiently informed, and they rarely deliberate. In a
recent Harris poll, 75 per cent of French respondents said they do not understand EU institutions.
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Europe has invented its own acronym-packed language. In a cabinet meeting before a recent
European Council, Francois Hollande reportedly turned on his ministers and advisors, waving
the briefing paper they’d given him: “What is this jibberish?” he demanded. “I don’t understand
a word of it, so how do you expect our partners to understand it?”
The problem is compounded in France by a difference of political culture. “The French don’t
understand negotiated compromise,” says Thierry Chopin of the Robert Schuman Foundation.
“For them, compromise means to compromise oneself. Europe is a permanent compromise.
German political culture is based on compromise.” Furthermore, “The EU parliament doesn’t
function on the basis of a left-right divide. That is incomprehensible to the French.”
If Europe is to begin to win back the loyalty of its citizens, heads of state and government must
loosen their grip on decision-making, and stop the back-room horse-trading that has
characterised the EU until now. The way in which the next president of the Commission is
chosen will be a major test of their willingness to do so. The new Commission that will take
office in the autumn needs to focus less on imposing austerity and sacrifice, more on helping
people. And the Union as a whole – like France itself – desperately needs what Hollande calls a
“shock of simplification”.
French politicians must stop blaming “Brussels” for their own incompetence. They must show
the importance of Europe by sending their best diplomats and politicians to Brussels, as Ireland
has long done. And they need to engage in meaningful, public debate on issues people care
about – the “posted workers” from poorer EU states who take French jobs; the presence of
Roma encampments around Paris, Lille and Lyon. Until or unless they do, such issues are a
godsend to the National Front.
Most of all – and this may be the biggest challenge for any politician – French and European
leaders need to elaborate a discourse that creates MEANING and a sense of direction, for their
own countries, and for this precious and perishable undertaking that is the European Union.
(ENDS)

